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Kiosk systems  with  metered private connections  for  some
households appear to be the most promising  way to recover costs
and meet consumers' cash flow needs (and counter their reluc-
tance to pay in P Jvance for a service they are not sure the gov-
ernment will deliver).  Kiosk systems can provide cheaper,
better, and more reliable water than water vendors do.
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This paper - a product of the Urban Development Division, Infrastructure and Urban Development
Department - is part of a larger effort in PRE to develop methodologies for estimating households'
willingness to pay for improved water services. Special emphasis is being given in this research program
to testing the usefulness and reliability of contingent valuation techniques in developing countries. Copies
of this paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please
contact Vino David, room S 10-1  19, extension 33736 (36 pages with figures and tables).
What economic and polical factors have made  small amounts for improved services - even
cost recovery for rural water systems so difficult  less than they are currently paying water ven-
in the Nsuuka district of Anambra State, Nige-  dors.  Currerit arrangements for cost recovery-
ria?  Through in-depth interviews with 395  fixed monthly fees for both public taps and
households in three rural communities,  unmetered private connections - are inappro-
Whittington, Okorafor, Okore, and McPhail  priate.  Kiosk systems - or kiosk systems with
learned that households in the region do not  metered private connections for some house-
want to pay for water in advance or commit  holds - are the most promising way to improve
themselves to a fixed monthly payment for  cost recovery and meet consumers' cash flow
water. They want the freedom to buy water only  needs.  Kiosk systems can provide less expen-
when they use it -partly  because they do not  sive, more reliable, and better quality water than
want to buy watcr in the rainy seasoi- and partly  water vendors do.
because they want control of their cash flow in
the event of more pressing needs.  Equally im-  It is not yet possible to generalize these
portant, they do not trust government to provide  results to other parts of Nigeria or other develop-
a reliable public water supply. They do not want  ing countries, but the advantages of kiosk
to pay in advance for a service they are not sure  systems and metered private connections are
they will ever get.  likely to be equally valid in many other places.
If required to pay a fixed fee every month,
households are willing to pay only relatively
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Ukunda,  Kenya .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31I.  INTRODUCTION:  IMPASSE  IN  RURAL  WATER  SUPPLY  PROVISION
1.01  During  the  rainy  season  from  May  until  October,  the  northern  part  of
Anambra  State  in Nigeria  receives  approximately  1,500  mm (about  60 inches)  of
rainfall  and almost  all  households  in rural  communities  collect  rainfall  for
domestic  water  uses',  and  in  many  villages  streams  and  springs  provide  additional
water  supplies. From  November  to April,  however,  this  region  receives  almost
no rainfall. During  the  dry  season  surface  water  sources  are  very  limited,  and
the  depth  of groundwater  is  relatively  great  (often  over 200  meters). People
must  frequently  spend  several  hours  a  day  collecting  water,  either  walking  long
distances  to streams  or queuing  at springs  with  very low  flows.
1.02  For  most  households  the  only  alternative  to  such  time-consuming  water
collection  practices  is  to  purchase  water  from  tanker  trucks  (which  obtain  water
from  boreholes  in towns)  or from  neighbors  who purchase  from tanker  trucks.
These tanker  truck  vendors  sell water  throughout  the rural  areas of Anambra
State,  but  are  particularly  active  during  the  dry  season  in  the  northern  region.
The  tanker  trucks  appear  to  reach  almost  all  rural  communities  in  this  region,
traveling  long  distances  on  unpaved  roads  and  then  winding  their  way  through  the
villages  on what are  often  little  more than  dirt  paths. However,  the  service
from  tanker  trucks  is  often  unreliable.  Households  are  never  sure  when  a  tanker
truck  will  come  to  their  village,  or  reach  their  house  with  sufficient  supplies.  '
1.03  To meet the water needs of rural communities  in Anambra State,
Nigerian  federal  and  state  government  agencies  have  drilled  hundreds  of  boreholes
over the  past two  decades  which  have struck  water  in sufficient  quantities  to
supply  nearby  commmities.  Many  were  equipped  with pumps  and  generators,  and
some  supply  small  piped  distribution  systems  with  public  and  private  taps. Today
the  majority  of these  boreholes  are  not  providing  water. Some  have  never  been
operational  and  were simply  capped  after  they  were  drilled. Other  systems  ran
for  a time and then  fell  into  disuse. Of those  which  do work,  many are  used
mostly  to supply  water  to tanker  trucks.
1.04  There  thus  exists  this  paradox:  why do  households  continue  to spend
large  sums  of money  buying  water  from  tanker  truck  vendors  while  boreholes  in
their  village  stand  idle?  Although  there  are some interesting  peculiarities
I/  Rainwater  is collected  in several  ways:  (a)  from  roofs,  with and  without
gutters,  (b)  from  shallow  depressions,  and  (c)  directly  in  5-8  gallon  clay  pots.
2/  Water  vendors  in  urban  areas  of  Anambra  State  provide  much  more  reliable
service  than in rural  areas. For  a description  of a  water  vending  activities
in the  city  of Onitsha,  Anambra  State,  see  Whittington,  Lauria  and  Mu, 1989.about  this  specific  case,  the  situation  in  northern  Anambra  State  is  not  unusual.
Publicly-owned  rural  water  systems  in  many  parts  of Africa  no longer  function
and  have  been abandoned,  yet water  vendors  are  active  in many rural  areas  of
Africa.' This is true  despite  the  fact  that  th6  delivery  of water  by vendors
is  almost  always  a  very  expensive  service  option  (Whittington,  Lauria,  Okun,  and
Mu, 1989.)
1.05  This paper  looks  at the complex  of political  and economic  factors
which  have ^ontributed  to the  current  impasse  in rural  water  supply  provision
in  northern  Anambra  State  in  Nigeria. In-depth  interviews  were  conducted  with
395  households  in three  communities  in the Nsukka  district  of Anambra  State
concerning  their  household  water  use  and  storage  practices,  water  expenditures
to vendors,  willingness  to pay for improved  water supplies,  and household
socioeconomic  characteristics.  After  the  surveys  were  analyzed,  follow-up,  open-
ended interviews  were carried out with  individuals  and  small groups of
respondents  and  community  leaders  in  the  villages  in  order  to  probe  some  of the
results  of the  surveys. This  paper  reports  on what  was learned  from  both the
surveys  and follow-up  conversations,  and examines  the implications  of these
findings  for  cost  recovery  strategies  in  the  rural  water  sector.
1.06  In summary,  the results  of the  analysis  show that successful  cost
recovery in  the  rural water  sector in  Anambra State requires careful
consideration  of households'  preferences  regarding  the  way in  which  funds  are
collected  for  public  water  systems  and  the  timing  of such  payments. Households
do  not  want to  pay  for  water  in  advance  or  commit  themselves  to  a fixed  monthly
payment  for  water. People  want  the  freedom  to  buy  water  only  when  they  use it.
This  is  in  part  due  to  the  seasonal  nature  of  water  use: many  people  do  not  want
to buy  water  during the rainy season.  Households also desire tnis flexibility
and  greater  control  over  their  cash  flow  in  order  to  meet  other  more  immediately
pressing  needs such as unexpected  medical emergencies.  Equally  important,
households  do  not  trust  the  government  to  provide  a  reliable  public  water  supply,
and  thus  do  not  want  to  pay  in  advance  for  a service  they  are  not  sure  they  will
ever get.  If they are required  to pay a fixed  fee  every  month,  the survey
results  show that  households  are  only  willing  to pay  relatively  small  amounts
for  improved  water  services  (i.e.,  even  less  than  they  are  currently  paying  water
vendors).
1.07  These  findings  have  important  implications  for  the  way  in  which  cost
recovery  systems  should  be designed. We believe  that  a kiosk  system  in  which
individuals  pay  by the  bucket  for  water--or  a  kiosk  system  coupled  with  metered
private  connections--would  be  much  more  responsive  to  households'  cash  flow  needs
and also overcome  households'  current distrust  of government.  Moreover,
preliminary  calculations  suggest  that  a kiosk  system  would  be able to collect
much  greater  revenues  than  a system  of fixed  monthly  charges,  and  that  in some
cases  such  revenues  may  be sufficient  to  pay  for  both  the  capital  and  operating
and  maintenance  costs  of such  a system. Kiosk  systems  are  needed  because  they
can  provide  less  expensive,  more reliable,  and  better  quality  water than the
existing  water  vending  system.
2/  An estimated  2 out of 3 rural  Africans  are still  without  access  to an
improved  water  supply. Such  estimates,  however,  never  include  water  vendors  as
an improved  water  supply.-3-
II.  THE  STUDY  AREA  AND  FIELD  PROCEDURES
2.01  The field  work for this  study  was conducted  in May 1989 in three
large  Igbo  villages  in  the  Nsukka  district  of  Anambra  State:  Edem,  Ekwegbe,  and
Umunko. These  villages  are  believed  to  be representative  of conditions  in  many
areas  of Nsukka  district. The  villages  were  10 to 30  kilometers  from  the  town
of  Nsukka,  the  district  center  and  the  site  of  the  main  campus  of the  University
of Nigeria. The  population  of these  villages  is difficult  to  estimate  because
the  dwellings  are  widely  dispersed-  -often  with  several  concentrations  of  housing
and  commercial  activity-  -and because  the  only  census  estimates  are  more  than  two
decades  old.  However,  the study  villages  probably  range  in size from about
10,000  (Edem)  to 25,000  (Ekwegbe).
2.02  All three  villages  are  predominantly  agricultural  communities. The
majority  of the  population  are  farmers  (62  percent  of the  sample  respondents  in
Edem;  69  percent  in  Ekwegbe;  80  percent  in  Umunko;  see  Table  1). The  principal
crops  grown in the area are cassava,  yams,  and maize.  The second  and third
largest  occupational  groupings  are  "small  traders"  and  "skilled  laborers."  None
of the  study  villages  had  electric  services,  though  a  handful  of  households  in
each  village  had their  own generators. All villages  had primary  schools  and
basic  market  facilities. Table  1 summarizes  some of the  other  socioeconomic
characteristics  of the  three  villages.
2.03  The  household  questionnaire  was  developed  and  then  pretested  in  a  nearby
village  similar  to  the  three  study  villages.  The  questionnaire  was  administered
by a team  of ten  enumerators,  who received  almost  two  weeks  of training. The
enumerators  were  all  secondary  school  graduates  from  the  Nsukka  district  who  were
familiar  with local  customs  and  water  use  practices. In order  to facilitate
execution  of  the  surveys,  the  chief  and  local  government  leaders  for  each  village
were  consulted,  and  their  cooperation  in  the  etudy  was  secured  before  work  began.
2.04  In  total,  132  households  were interviewed  in  Edem,  128  in  Ekwegbe,  and
135  in  Umunko. It  was  impossible  to  construct  well-defined  sample  frames  in  any
of the villages  within the time and resource  constraints  of this study.
Enumerators  were simply  dropped in different  parts of the communities  and
instructed  to walk in a specified  direction  and to interview  every other
household. Interviews  were  conducted  in the  afternoon  and  early  evening,  when
people  were likely  to be back from their  work in the fields. Although  this
sampling  procedure  appears  to us to have yielded  a relatively  representative
sample  of households,  it  may have introduced  biases  of which  we are unaware.
However,  we are  unable  to speculate  about  how such  biases  may  have  affected  the
survey  results.Table 1:  Socioeconomic Characteristics of Sample Households
In the Study V'illages
VILLAGE  EDEM  EKWEGBE  UMUNKO  TOTAL  SAMPLE
HOUSEHOLD  SIZE  8.0  9.6  6.9  82
(MEAN  NUMBER  OF  PERSONS)
NUMBER  OF WOMEN  AS A PERCENT  OF TOTAL
ADULTS  IN HOUSEHOLD  60  60  60  60
(MEAN)
NUMBER  OF CHILDREN  IN HOUSEHOLD  4.2  4.9  3.4  4.2
(MEAN)
EDUCATION  2.5  3.1  3.3  3.0
(MEAN  NUMBER  OF  YEARS  FOR  HIGHEST  EDUCATED
PERSON  IN THE  HOUSEHOD)
PERCENT  OF HEADS  OF HOUSEHOLD  WHO
ARE FARMERS  62  69  80  70
(MEANW
VALUE OF HOUSEHOLD  ASSETS  1.8  1.3  1.0  1A
(MEAN  IN 000's  OF NAIRA)
HOUSING  CONSTRUCTION
(PERCENT)
THATCH  ROOF/MUD  WALL  21  16  42  26
METAL  ROOF/MUD  WALL  19  15  12  15
METAL  ROOF/BRICK  WALL  13  37  16  22
METAL  ROOF/PLASTERED  BRICK  WALL  39  26  21  29-5-
III.  CURRENT  WATER  SUPPLY  SITUATION  IN  THE  STUDY  VILLAGES
Past  Investments
3.01  At the  time  of this  study  none  of the  villages  had an operational
water  supply  system. In Ekwegbe  the  federal  government  had  drilled  a  borehole
and  installed  a storage  tank  four  years  earlier. The  system  had  actually  been
successfully  tested  but  then  was  stopped  and  has  never  operated  again. Now  the
50,000-gallon  elevated  storage  tank  stands  as an ever-present  reminder  of the
failed  promises  of an improved  water  supply. Umunko  has a borehole  that  was
drilled  and  capped;  the  village  has  never  received  any  water  from  it,  and  there
is  no prospect  of  use in  the  foreseeable  future. In Edem  a  borehole  was  being
drilled  at  the  time  of  our  survey,  and  the  village  leadership  was  attempting  to
raise  the funds  to finish  che  drilling  and  to install  a pump,  generator,  and
storage  tank.
Water  Use Practices
3.02  In the  rainy  season  the  majority  of  households  in  all  three  of the
study  villages  depend  on  rainwater  as  their  primary  source  of  water  for  all  major
water  uses:  drinking,  cooking,  clothes  washing,  and  bathing  (Table  2).  For
example,  in both Ekwegbe  and  Umunko  95 percent  of the  households  interviewed
reported  that  rainwater  was  their  primary  water  source  for  drinking  and  cooking
during  the  rainy  season  (Figure  1)  In  Edem  69 percent  used  rainwater  as their
primary  source,  and  30 percent  relied  on  nearby  springs.  Onlly  i  tu  3 paLicLiL
of  the  sample  households  reported  purchasing  water  from  tanker  trucks  during  the
rainy  season. In contrast,  from 17 to 53 percent  of the  villagers  relied  on
tanker  trucks  for  their  primary  source  of  drinking  and  cooking  water  during  the
dry season (Figure  2).  In all of the study  villages  the majority  of the
population  bathe  at  home,  not  at the  spring  or  stream. Clot1hes  washing  is  done
at  home  and  at the  spring  or stream.
3.03  Because  of  this  heavy  reliance  on  rainwater  collection,  the  majority
of  households  have  substantial  water  storage  capabilities.  In  both  Ekwegbe  and
Umunko  more  than  60  percent  of  the  sample  households  have  more  than  1,000  gallons
of  storage  (Figure  3).Y In  addition  to  buckets,  clay  pots,  and  45-gallon  drums,
these  households  have  either  a large  metal  storage  tank  or a  hand-dug,  cement-
lined  rainwater  collection  pit in  the  yard.  Few  households  in  Edem  have large
tanks  or pits,  but 75 percent  of the sample  households  there  still  have the
capability  of storing  more than  50 gallons  of  water.
3.04  Not  only  do  most  people  rely  on  rainwater,  but  they  also  believe  that
the  quality  of rainwater  is "good"  (Figure  4).  Only  10 percent  of the  sample
households  rated  the  quality  of rainwater  as "poor," and  almost  half of these
were  households  with thatched  roofs. People  are  even  more satisfied  with the
quality  of  water  from  springs  than  with  rainwater.  Seventy-five  percent  of the
households  reported  that  the  quality  of  water  from  springs  in  the  rainy  season
was "good."
i/  Estimates  of storage  volumes  should  be interpreted  as only  approximate.
For  example,  steel  tanks  are fabricated  by local  artisans  and  are  not made in
truly  standard  sizes.Table 2:  Household Water Source Choice for Major Water Uses
(Percentage of Households)
DRY SEASON  I l  RAINY  SEASON
DRINKING  AND COOKING  CLOTHES  WASHING  DRINKING  AND COOKING I  CLOTHES  WASHING
AND 13ATHING  AND  BATHING
VILLAGE  PRIMARY  SECONDARY  PRIMARUY SECONDARY i  PRIMARY  SECONDARY  PRIMARY  SECONDARY
EDEM
SPRING  83  16  75  18  30  65  18  70
STREAM  - - - - - - _
TANKER  17  57  24  5.1  1  1  1  3
RAIN  - - 1  1  69  29  81  17
N J  OTHER  - 27  - 30  - 5  - 10
SOURCE
EKWEBGE
SPRING  33  26  33  27  5  29  5  30
STREAM  12  14  12  14  - 12  - 11 
TANKER  53  41  53  39  - 3  - 2
RAIN  2  1  2  1  95  6  95  9
NO OTHER  - 18  19  - 50  - 48
SOURCE
UMUNKO
SPRING  44  10  41  12  4  18  5  16
STREAM  22  18  22  18  - 6  1  5
TANKER  33  50  35  45  1  1  1  2
RAIN  1  2  2  3  95  3  93  5
NO  OTHER  - 20  - 22  - 72  - 72
SOURCE7-
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3.05  In  the  dry  season  household  water  use  is  quite  different.  Rainwater
obviously is not available,  and the time required  to collect  water from
traditional  sources  such  as springs  increases  substantially,  because  the  flows
from  springs  are  reduced  and  queue  times  may increase  to several  hours  (Figure
5).  In Edem  the average  time  households  spend  per day collecting  water  from
springs  in the  dry season  is more than  7  hours;  in Ekwegbe  it is  more than  5
hours  per day. In  Umunko  the  average  time  spent  collecting  water  from  springs
is  about  4  hours  per  day  (this  does  not  vary  from  the  dry  to  rainy  season  because
the  spring  there  is large  and  has a more or less  uniform  flow  throughout  the
year).
3.06  Rather  than spend  so much time collecting  watcr from traditional
sources,  most households  in the  study  villages  bought  at least  some  of their
water during  the dry season  from tanker  trucks  or from neighbors  who were
supplied  by  tanker  trucks.  As  was  shown  in  Table  1,  in  Ekwegbe  95  percent  bought
some water from tankers  or neighbors,  in Umunko  84 percent,  and in Edem 80
percent. In  Ekwegbe  53  percent  of the  sample  households  used  tanker  trucks  or
neighbors  as their prim;ry source of water for drinking  and cooking;  the
comparable  percentages  in  Umunko  and  Edem  were 33  and  17.
3.07  Tha  prices  charged  by tanker  trucks  were  fairly  similar  in  the  three
villages  (Figure  6).  A 45-gallon  drum  of  water  sold  for  about  5 naira  (NO.11
per  gallon).Y In  Ekwegbe  and  Umunko  it cost  about  N80 to  have  a tanker  fill  a
1,000-gallon  tank (NO.08  per gallon);  in Edem about  160 (NO.06  per gallon).
Households  purchasing  small  quantities  of  water  from  neighbors  paid  higher  prices
per  gallon. Four  gallons  of  water  purchased  by the  bucket  cost  NO.50  to  NO.65
(NO.12-0.16  per  gallon)  (Figure  7).
What  Are  Households  SRending  Now  for  Water?
3.08  Many  households  spend  substantial  amounts  of  money  purchasing  water
from tanker  trucks  and  neighbors  during  the  dry season  (Figure  8).  Households
in  Umunko  are spending  the least  (mean  monthly  household  expenditure  - N35);
slightly  less  than  50  percent  of the  households  are  spending  more  than  N26  per
month. On the  o.her  hand,  households  in  Ekwegbe  are  spending  substantially  more
than  this (mean  - N63). More  than  60 percent  of the  households  in Ekwegbe  are
spending  more than  N26  per  month,  and  about  40 percent  are spending  more than
N50  per  month. In  Edem  less  than  30  percent  of the  households  are  spending  more
than  N50  per  month  (mean  monthly  expenditure  - N46). On an annual  basis,  most
households  are  probably  spending  between  6  and  10  percent  of  their  income  buying
water  from  vendors. To  put  the  magnitude  of these  expenditures  on  vended  water
in perspective,  an average  household  in rural areas of Nsukka  district  is
spending  US$5-8  per  month  in  the  dry  season,  which  is  about  the  same  in  absolute
terms  as the  amount  many  households  in industrialized  countries  pay  per  month
for  much  more  water  and  much  better  service.
5/  At the  time  of the  study,  N1.00  - US$0.133,  N7.50  - US$1.00.- 10 -
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3.09  These  estimates  of  monthly  household  expenditure  on  water  are  based
on the respondents'  answers  to questions  about  how much water the  household
purchased  on average  per week  by different  size  container,  multiplied  by the
average  prices  of water in the village.  The estimates  reflect  substantial
uncertainty,  however,  because  respondents  often  had difficulty  thinking  about
an average  amount  of water  purchased,  in  part  because  the  service  from  tanker
trucks  was  typically  irregular  and  households  only  purchased  water  from  a  tanker
when  one  appeared.9
3.10  In  summary,  the  survey  data  clearly  show  that  household  water  supply
in these villages is a seasonal  problem and that in the dry season  many
households  are spending  substantial  amounts  of money purchasing  water from
tanker  trucks  and  neighbors.  There  would  appear  to  be  a  great  need  for  improved
service  in the dry season.  But  whether  households  would use or pay for an
improved  water  supply  in the  rainy  season  is  uncertain.
j/  It  was  also  very  difficult  to  estimate  household  income  and  expenditures.
Many  households  in the  sample  villages  grow  a  substantial  portion  of their  own
food;  almost  all  own their  houses. Much  of the  available  cash income  can  be
spent  on things  other than food and  housing.  Hence,  any estimate  of water
expenditures  as  a  percentage of  total household expenditures  is highly
speculative.- 13  -
IV.  THE  COST OF AND DEMAND  FOR IMPROVED RURAL WATER SYSTEMS
What  Do Improved  Rural  Water  Systems  Cost?
4.01  There  is  little  variation  in  the  choice  of  an improved  water  supply
system  in  northern  Anambra  State. The  only  reliable  possibility  for  almost  all
communities  is a  deep borehole.  The costs of such rural water schemes
denominated  in  naira  have  been  changing  rapidly  over  the  last  several  years  due
to  the  current  structural  adjustment  process  in  Nigeria,  but it is  possible  to
develop  some  reasonably  accurate  estimates  as of May 1989.2'  A typical  system
for  a  village  with  a  population  of 10,000  requires  a  borehole  approximately  200
meters  deep,  a  submersible  pump  and  cables,  generator,  pump  house,  storage  tank,
and  a limited  pipeline  distribution  network  with  standposts.  Table  3  presents
an  estimate  of  the  capital  costs,  operation  and  maintenance  costs,  and  the  total
annual  costs of a simple  water system  with a limited  distribution  network,
assuming  different  capital  recovery  factors.F  As illustrated,  the  total  annual
costs  of  such  a  system  are  probably  on  the  order  of  N200,000-250,000--or  US$2.70-
3.30  per  capita  per  year.
4.02  The average  size  of a household  in the  sample  villages  is  about  8
persons.  Assuming  a  conservative  population  estimate  of  10,000  per  village,  the
costs  of such water systems  could  be spread  over about 1,200  households  per
village.  If all the households  in a village  contributed,  the total  monthly
costs--capital  and operations  and  maintenance--per  household  would be in the
range  of N14 to  N17 (US$1.90  to  US$2.30). The  payments  required  to  cover  the
operation  and maintenance  expenses  alone are much lower,  only about N2.10
(US$0.30)  per  household  per  month.
Current  Cost  Recovery  Practice
4.03  The  vast  majority  of the  capital  costs  of  boreholes  that  have  been
drilled  to date in the area have been paid for by the Anambra  State  Water
Corporation  (ASWC)  or the  federal  government. Increasingly,  village  councils
are  being  asked  to raise  money  to contribute  to the  costs  of construction,  but
such  contributions  are typically  difficult  to mobilize  and cover  only  a small
portion  of  the  total  costs.
4.04  ASWC does not come close to recovering  even the operation  and
maintenance  costs  of the  rural  water  systems  that  are  operational.  The  existing
cost  recovery  policy  is to charge  the  community  N90  per  month  for  each  public
tap  in  the  village. A community  can  have  as many  taps  as it  wishes  and  is
2/  Based  on personal  communication  with the  general  manager  of the  Anambra
State  Water  Corporation,  and  cost  estimates  included  in Plans  for  Development
of  Rural  Water  Supply  and  Sanitation  in  Anambra  State,  Vols.  I  & II,  by IWACO.
May,  1989.
I/  The  costs  of such  a system  increase  significantly  as the length  of the
distribution  system  increases. The cost  estimates  presented  in  Table  3 could
easily  be 50 percent  higher  if a  more  extensive  distribution  network  (e.g.,  5
kilometers  of  pipe)  were installed.Table  3:  Costs  of an Improved  Water  Supply  System  (Deep Borehole  Scheme)
in Anambra  State,  Nigeria  (May, 1989)*
CAPITAL  COSTS
BOREHOLE  200,000
(200 m deep;  300 mm diameter)
PUMP AND CABLES  100,000
GENERATOR  100,000
PUMP HOUSE  25,000
EQUIPMENT  INSTALLATION  10,000
STORAGE  TANK--ELEVATED  250,000
PIPELINE  DISTRIBUTION  SYSTEM  600.000
1,285,000
ANNUAL  OPERATING  COSTS
(Excluding  Major  Maintenance)
LABOR  15,000
FUEL AND LUBRICANTS  10,000
MINOR  MAINTENANCE  5.000
30,000
TOTAL  ANNUAL  COSTS
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willing  to  pay  for. If  a  tap  were  installed  for  every  500  inhabitants,  a  village
of 10,000  people  would  have to pay  N1,800  per month  for  20 taps. This amount
would  in  some  communities  just  about  pay  the  operation  and  maintenance  costs  of
the  system,  but  in  practice  the  village  councils  are  unwilling  or  unable  to  raise
funds  of  this  magnitude  on  a  monthly  basis. Communities  generally  decide  to  have
many  fewer  taps,  with  the  result  that  the  number  of  taps  is  inadequate  to  service
the  population,  queue  times  are  long,  and  many  people  still  rely  on  traditional
sources  and  on vendors--whose  service  may  cost far  more  within  the  scope  of a
single  month  (see  Figure  8 that  shows  average  monthly  expenditures  for  water  in
the  dry season).
4.05  ASWC finds it particularly  difficult  to collect  monthly  charges
during  the  rainy  season.  Water  systems  are  often  cut  off  during  the  rainy  season
for  lack  of  payment.  When  the  dry  season  begins,  the  village  leadership  and  ASWC
negotiate  the terms  under  which the water system  will be turned  on and the
community  will pay  its  arrears.
How  Much  Do Households  Say  They  Are  Willing  to  Pay
for  an ImDroved  Public  Water  System?
4.06  Households  in  the  sample  were  asked  a  series  of  structured  questions
designed  to determine  whether  they  would  choose  to pay for  a public  tap  or a
private  connection  to an improved  water  supply  if  different  monthly  rates  were
charged.  The questions  were designed  to elicit  a monthly  bid for  perpetuity
with  no seasonal  variation. 2'  Figure  9 summarizes  respondents'  willingness-to-
pay (WTP)  bids for access  to public  taps in all three  study  villages.2  The
majority  of respondents  in all three  villages  indicated  that they would  be
willing  to pay  N5 per  month  for  access  to  public  taps,  but  that  they  would  not
pay  more  than  N15  per  month. In  each  village  about  25  percent  of  the  respondents
said  that  they  would  not  pay  even  N5 per  month  for  access  to  public  taps. Most
of the  costs  of an  improved  water  system  could  be covered  by a  charge  of  N15  per
month  (see  above),  but  only  five  to  fifteen  percent  of  households  were  prepared
to  pay  this  amount.
4.07  Figure  10 presents  similar  information  for respondents'  bids for
private  connections.  Slightly  more  than  half  of the  respondents  in  Ekwegbe  and
Umunko  indicated  that they  would pay a fixed rate of N20 per month for an
unlimited  quantity  of  water  from  an  unmetered  private  connection,  but  that  they
would not pay N40 per month.  In Edem the corresponding  percentage  was 42
percent. About  40 percent  of the  respondents  in  Ekwegbe  and  Umunko  said that
they  would  not  pay N20  per  month  for  a private  connection;  in Edem 57  percent
said  they  would  not  pay  N20. Less  than  5  percent  of the  houses  in  each  village
said  they  would  pay  N40  per  month  for  a  private  connection.
2/  Respondents  were cold  that  there  would  be no initial  connection  fee  or
installation  cost  for  connecting  their  house  to the  piped  system. They  would
only  be responsible  for  paying  the  monthly  fee.
IO/  For  detailed  discussions  of the  application  of the  contingent  valuation
methodology  to the problem  of estimating  households'  willingness  to pay for
improved  water supplies,  see Whittington,  Briscoe,  Mu, and Barron  1989;  and
Whittington,  Mujwahuzi,  McMahon,  and  Choe  1988.- 16  -
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Why  Do  Households  Say  They  Are  Willing  to  Pay  So  Little  for  Improved  Public  Water
Service?
4.08  These findings  from the  household  surveys  are perplexing.  Many
economic  theorists  and critics  have expressed  concern that the results  of
willingness-to-pay  surveys  will  not  be  reliable  because  respondents  will  say  they
will pay much more than they will in fact pay when confronted  with a real
decision. In this  case  the  evidence  seems  to indicate  just  the  opposite. For
example,  although  57  percent  of  respondents  in  Edem  said  that  they  would  not  pay
N20  per  month  for  a  private  connection,  about  two-thirds  reported  that  they  were
already  paying  more  than  N25  per  month  during  the  dry season  to tanker  trucks
and  neighbors.  Only  2  percent  of  the  respondents  in  Ekwegbe  said  that  they  would
pay  N40  per  month  for  a private  connection,  but  40 percent  are already  paying
more than  N50  per  month  to  vendors  in  the  dry  season.
4.09  Why do households  say that  they  are  willing  to pay so little  for
improved  public  water  service  when they  are  already  paying  such  high prices  to
water  vendors? The  answer  to  this  question  has important  policy  implications,
because  if the  majority  of  households  are  really  unwilling  to pay  more than  a
few  naira  per  month  for  a public  tap,  then  progress  toward  full  cost  recovery
is not likely  in the rural  areas of Anambra  State.il'  If the provision  of
subsidized  services  is  not  feasible,  the  current  system  of  water  vending  may  be
the most appropriate  service level at this time.  On the other hand, if
households  would  pay  for  the  costs  of  an improved  water  supply  system  once  they
have  experience  with  it,  and  if  it  were  made  available  under  conditions  that  they
found  more  attractive  than  current  government  projects,  then  rural  water  supply
projects  could  be financially  viable.
4.10  To  better  understand  households'  bids,  we reinterviewed  half  of the
sample  households  in  each  of  the  three  villages  and  gave  them  an opportunity  to
revise  their  answers  to the  willingness-to-pay  questions  from  the  previous  day.
Table  4 presents  (1)  the  percentage  of respondents  who revised  their  bids for
public  taps  and  for  private  connections  in  each  village;  (2)  the  proportion  who
revised their bids downward (and upward); and (3) the average percentage
reduction  (and  increase)  of these  revised  bids.
4.11  If  the  respondent  revised  his  (or  her)  answer,  the  enumerator  asked
him to  explain  the  reasons  why  he changed  his  willingness-to-pay  bid.  Because
the  respondent  had  also  been  asked  how  much  the  household  usually  spends  on  water
from  tanker  trucks,  the  willingness-to-pay  bid  for  a  public  tap  could  be  compared
with the  current  monthly  expenditure  on vended  water.  If the  willingness-to-
pay  bid  was  less  than  what  the  respondent  said  the  household  was  currently  paying
water  vendors  in  the  dry  season,  the  enumerator  asked  the  respondent  to  explain
why  his  bid for  an improved  water  system  was  lower.
ji/  A multivariate  analysis  of the  determinants  of the  WTP  bids is  presented
in  a  second  paper  (Whittington,  Smith,  Ruiz,  Okorafor,  Okore,  and  McPhail,  1989).
In summary,  the  socioeconomic  variables  suggested  by economic  theory  do affect
households'  WTP  bids,  which  increases  our  confidence  in  the  reliability  of these
bids.- 18  -
Table 4: Analysis of Revised Willingness-to-pay Bids
Village  Public Tap  I  Private Connection
EDEM
PERCENTAGE  OF  BIDS  REVISED  23  33
PERCENT  REVISED  DOWN  79  65
PERCENT  REVISED  UP  29  35
MEAN  PERCENTAGE  REDUCTION  OF  68  63
DOWNWARD  REVISED  BIDS
EKWEGBE
PERCENTAGE  OF BIDS  REVISED  7  9
PERCENT  REVISED  DOWN  50  0
PERCENT  REVISED  UP  50  100
MEAN  PERCENTAGE  REDUCTION  OF  80  n/a
DOWNWARD  REVISED  BIDS
UMUNKO
PERCENTAGE  OF BIDS  REVISED  16  1i
PERCENT  REVISED  DOWN  73  82
PERCENT  REVISED  UP  27  18
MEAN  PERCENTAGE  REDUCTION  OF  53  57
DOWNWARD  REVISED  BIDS
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4.12  Figure  11  summarizes  reasons  respondents  gave  for  why they  were  not
willing  to pay more for an improved  water supply.  For all three  villages
"seasonal"  represented  a substantial  percentage  of the  responses  given  (20  to
40 percent). In this  context  "seasonal"  means  the  respondent  stated  that the
household  spends  the amount  calculated  (obtained  from responses  to previous
questions)  during  the  dry  season  but  would  not  spend  that  much  for  water  during
the  rainy  season. (The  willingness-to-pay  bids  given  by the  household  were  for
a monthly  obligation--irrespective  of  season.)
4.13  "Refutes  amount"  means  that  the  respondent  did  not  believe  that  the
household's  original  estimate  of the amount  being spent  on vended  water  was
correct.  This  could  be  because  the  household  spent  an  unusual  amount  during  the
period  inquired  about  or that  the  respondent  had difficulty  understanding  the
concept  of a  monthly  average.
4.14  "Government"  means  that  the  respondent  answered  that  (1)  he dii  not
trust  the  government  to  deliver  or  maintain  an improved  water  system;  (2)  that
it  was the  government's  responsibility  to provide  free  or cheaper-than-vended
water;  or (3)  that  the  household  had  already  been  paying  taxes  for  water  service
and it did not want to pay anything  more for a water system  run by the
government.  The  high  proportion  of  "government"  responses  in  Ekwegbe  (more  than
50 percent)  is not surprising  considering  the villag&'s  abandoned  elevated
storage  tank and capped  borehole.  This feeling  of resentment  could  also be
exacerbated  because a  nearby village--only  6  kilometers  away--has had  a
functioning  public  water  system  since  the  mid-1960s.W
4.15  A response  of "cash  flow"  meant  that  the  respondent  changed  his  bid
because  he decided  either  that  the  initial  bid  was  beyond  his  resources  or  that
he would  not  be able to  commit  to a  monthly  expenditure  in perpetuity  because
of  variations  in  disposable  income  from  month  to  month  and  season  to season.
4.16  "Other"  reasons  given  included  such  issues  as  tenancy,  concerns  over
rights of access to the taps, the fact that the household  makes money by
reselling  water,  or concerns  that  everyone  using  the  water  would  not  pay  their
fair  share.
Reasons  People  Say  They  Will Pay  Less For  an Improved  Water  System  Than  They
Currently  Pay  Vendors
4.17  On the basis of these responses  and more in-depth,  unstructured
interviews  with  selected  individuals  in  the  study  villages,  we  believe  that  there
are  in fact  three  different  and  important  types  of reasons  for  the  discrepancy
between  what  people  say  they  will  pay  the  government  for  water  and  what  they  are
currently  paying  to  vendors:  (1)  affordability  of  monthly  payments,  (2)  ignorance
of the magnitude  of current actual expenditures  on vended water, and (3)
pessimistic perceptions of  government reliability, responsibility,  and
entitlements.
2/  The  explanation  given  was that  one  of the  ministers  in a  previous  regime
came  from  that  other  village,  and  while  in  office  he was  able  to  attract  enough
resources  to the  village  to  have its  water  distribution  system  installed.- 20 -
4.18  Some  respondents'  answers  and  their  explanations  of them  make good
economic  sense  and are  probably  reliable  measures  of their  true  preferences.
Many  of the  households  who  revised  their  bids  downward  cited  economic  reasons.
The  specifics  of  the  explanations  varied,  but  the  essential  message  was  that  the
respondents  simply  felt  that  they  could  not  afford  to  pay  the  originally  stated
amount  on a  regular  monthly  basis.
4.19  The  seasonality  of  the  expenditures  for  improved  water  services  was
a  major  concern  of  many  of  the  respondents  who  gave  economic  explanations  of  why
they  could  not afford  to  pay  more for  water. Most  households  only  perceive  a
need  for  water  from  an improved  source  during  the  dry  season,  because  during  the
rainy  season  water is  readily  available  and is thought  to  be of good quality.
They  are thus  reluctant  to commit  themselves  to a fixed  monthly  water  payment
throughout  the  year.
4.20  This  problem  is  compounded  by seasonal  variations  in  the  demand  for
agricultural  labor. In the  northern  part  of  Anambra  State,  planting  occurs  at
the  beginning  of the  rainy  season,  in  mid-April  to  early  May. At this  time  the
demand  for  agricultural  labor  is  high,  and  the  daily  wage  is  about  N30 (US$4.00).
The demand  for  agricultural  labor  remains  strong  t.j  ,-hout most  of the  rainy
season  but disappears  almost  entirely  during  the  L;-  siason,  from  November  to
April.
4.21  At first  glance  such  high  agricultural  wages  would  seem  to indicate
that  the  opportunity  cost  of time  spent  carrying  water  would  also  be  very  high,
and thus trading  money for time saved  fetching  water would appear  to be an
attractive  exchange. However,  the  period  of high agricultural  wages occurs
precisely  when  water  is  most  easily  available.  Moreover,  during  the  rainy  season
cash  is  in  short  supply  because  it  is  needed  to  purchase  such  agricultural  inputs
as fertilizer.  During  the  dry  season,  when  water  collection  times  may  stretch
to  many  hours,  there  is  no  agricultural  work,  and  thus  the  economic  value  of  time
saved  is  very low.
4.22  In  addition,  the  time  value  of  money  is  very  high  in  rural  economies
whose  households  lack  access  to  credit. In  circumstances  where  incomes  are  low
and cash reserves  almost  nonexistent,  households  place a high premium on
maintaining  budget  flexibility.  A recurring  cash  obligation  such  as a  monthly
water  fee  may  not  be a  large  proportion  of  total  annual  income,  but  the  fact  that
it  must  be  paid  every  month  may  greatly  reduce  a  household's  discretionary  income
and  limit  its  ability  to  respond  to  emergencies.  For  all  of these  reasons  the
reluctance  of  households  to  commit  themselves  to a  regular  monthly  payment  for
improved  water  service  appears  to  be  a  sound  economic  decision,  even  though  they
pay  private  water  vendors  substantial  amounts  in the  dry  season.
4.23  In contrast  to this  economic  rationale  for  the  low  willingness-to-
pay  bids,  a  second,  alternative  explanation  is  that  households  often  did  not  know
or seemed  unable  to calculate  how  much money  they  were currently  spending  on
vended  water.  Because  service  from the tanker  trucks  was often  unreliable,
households'  purchases  were  irregular.  In  fact  households'  expenditures  over  an
extended  period  were  substantial,  but  the  notion  of  calculating  an  average  amount
spent  on  water  was difficult  to convey  in the  interviews,  and  we believe  that
many households  simply  did not know  how much they are spending  in total  for- 21
vended  water. They  purchased  water  when  they  had  the  money  and  when  the  ranker
truck  came  around. During  the  interviews  respondents  often  said  that  thoy  had
no choice  but to buy from tanker  trucks  and that they had to pay the  price
charged. Some  respondents  expressed  a  sense  of  hopelessness  at  what  they  often
perceived  as exploitation  by tanker  truck  vendors  (perhaps  in  part  because  it
was impossible  for  most  households  to afford  large  metal  storage  tanks  which
would  have  allowed  them  to  obtain  water  from  tanker  trucks  at  a  lower  per  gallon
cost).
4.24  These  first  two  explanations  fo.  the  respondents'  low  bids  are  based
on  different  conceptions  of  the  determinants  of  individuals'  behavior.  The  first
envisages  a  rational,  utility-maximizing  ecornomic  actor  who  carefully  considers
his consumption  choices  in light of severe  budget  constraints. The second
assumes  that the individual  is unable  to make such reasoned  decisions  before
purchasing  water. On  the  basis  of  the  survey  results  and  open-ended  interviews,
we do not believe  these  explanations  are  mutually  exclusive. It is entirely
plausible  that  some  households  more  closely  exhibit  one  type  of  behavior,  some
households  the  other. It is  also  possible  that  a single  household  understands
the time  value of money  and the  cash-flow  problems  associated  with making  a
regular  monthly  payment  for  improved  water  service,  but is  unable  to calculate
the  amount  currently  spent  on water  from  tanker  trucks.
4.25  A third  explanation  for the low willingness  to pay expressed  by
households  is noneconomic.  Many respondents  expressed  a lack of faith in
government  institutions  as  reliable  providers  of  water. They  also  indicated  that
they  felt  that  they  were entitled  to free  or subsidized  water  and that  it  was
the  government's  responsibility  to  provide  their  village  with  a  new  water  system.
For example,  some said that they already  paid taxes  that should  be used to
provide  such  services  as  water  supply. Others  indicated  that it  was not fair
that they should  be charged  more than  customers  in nearby  Nsukka,  where the
monthly  cost  per  household  for  a shared  yard  tap  in  a  multi-family  dwelling  was
N2.00.
4.26  Answers  of  this  kind  suggest  that  respondents'  maximum  willingness-
to-pay  bids  may be heavily  influenced  by their  low  expectations  regarding  the
reliability  of  water  services  provided  by government  and  by factors  other  than
the  economic  value  of  improved  water  service  to  the  household.  As  a  result,  from
an  economic  perspective  one  could  argue  that  the  contingent  valuation  exercise
failed to reveal households'  true preferences  for reliable  water supply.
However;  the  low  bids reveal  something  equally  important  for  policy  purposes:
that  many  households'  sense  of entitlement  and  equity  may  be a major  obstacle
to an effective  cost recovery  scheme.  In this sense the low bids are an
indicator  of likely  political  problems  associated  with any changes  in policy
toward  increased  cost  recovery. This  is  not  to imply  that  attitudes  about  the
appropriate  role for the  government  in the  provision  of rural  water  supplies
cannot  be  changed,  but  simply  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  political  leadership
on the  part  of both the  water  corporation  and  the  community  government  in any
such  effort.*  22  -
4.27  If all  of these  three  explanations  for  the low  willingness  to pay
for  water  are  true  to  some  extent,  as  we  believe  to  be the  case,  then  attempting
to  predict  how  households  will  respond  to  a  particular  service  option  and  payment
arrangement  is  quite  problematic.  Given  this  uncert.Mtnty  in  the  likely  responses
of households  to water supply  projects  with different  payment and delivery
characteristics,  how  should  the  government  and  donors  proceed  in  the  rural  water
sector?- 23 -
V.  BREAKING  THE  IMPASSE  IN RURAL  WATER  PROVISION:
DISCUSSION  AND POLICY  RECOMMENDATIONS
5.01  The results of this study indicate  that ASWC faces two major
obstaclea  to the implementation  of a financially  viable  rural  water supply
program. First,  there  is a  mismatch  between  the  year-round  financial  needs  of
ASWC and the  seasonal  value  of  water  to  households.  The  majority  of the  costs
of a typical  rural  water  system  are  for  capital:  the  drilling  of the  borehole;
the  generator,  pump,  and  storage  tank;  and  the  installation  of the  distribution
line. From  an  economic  efficiency  point  of  view,  a  water  system  should  generally
be used most of the  year  because  these  costs  are incurred  whether  or not the
system  is functioning.  However,  for  a variety  of reasons  households  are  very
concerned  about  the  timing  of  payments  for  water  and  want  to  be able  to adjust
their  payments  to  reflect  their  other  consumption  needs. Specifically,  they  want
the  flexibility  to  purchase  water  only  in the  dry  season.
5.02  In practice,  if an improved  water system is operational,  many
households  may  find  it  more  convenient  to  collect  water  from  the  improved  source
even  during  the  rainy  season,  but  the  problem  facing  ASWC  and  the  community  is
how to keep systems  operational  until  households  have gained  this  experience.
One  possibility  would  be  to  allow  households  to  disconnect  from  the  system  during
the  rainy  season  with  only  a  modest  reconnection  charge. This  way  people  will
not  feel  forced  to  pay  for  water  when  they  can  get  it  free. Another  possibility
would  be a seasonal  pricing  policy  which  would  charge  households  less in the
rainy season in order to encourage  them to continue  using water from the
distribution  system.
5.03  Second,  confidence  in  governmental  institutions  has  broken  down  and
people  no longer  trust  that  the  government  can  constrtuct  and  manage  an improved
water  system. Households  will  pay  for  water  when  they  receive  it,  but  because
of poor  performance  by the  government  in the  past,  there  is  greater  reluctance
to  contribute  anything  close  to the  true  value  of the  service  in advance  or to
commit  to a  monthly  payment  before  the  household  knows  how  reliable  the  system
will  be.  Households  quite  reasonably  fear  that  they  may  be required  to  make  a
regular  payment  for  a  water  system  that  does  not  work,  yet still  be forced  to
buy  water  from  vendors.
5.04  These  two  obstacles-  -the  timing  of  household  payments  for  water  and
lack of trust in the government--have  important  policy implications. Both
suggest  that  the  actual  financing  scheme  and  cost  recovery  system  used  in  rural
water  supply  programs  are  likely  to  have a  major  impact  on the  benefits  of the
improved  water  scheme  to  households,  and  thus  on the  probable  success  of rural
water  projects.  The  cost  recovery  arrangements  currently  in  use  in  Anambra  State
have  failed  to  generate  any  significant  amount  of resources.  However,  the  fact
that  so  many  people  purchase  water  from  vendors  indicates  that  there  is  a  large
potential  customer  and  revenue  base  in the  rural  communities  in  Anambra  State,
and that  people  are able  and  willing  to pay substantial  amounts  for improved
water  service. This revenue  base  cannot,  however,  be effectively  tapped  with
the  existing  cost  recovery  system.- 24 -
5.05  ASWC's  present  policy  of  providing  unmetered  private  connections  in
some  rural  water  systems  is  a  sure  recipe  for  failure  in  terms  of  cost  recovery.
In general,  a water  utility  that  provides  unmetered  private  water  connections
cannot  hope to recover  its  costs  unless  almost  all  households  in a particular
service  area choose  to connect  to the  distribution  system. This is because
households  with unmetered  connections  can provide water  at essentially  zero
marginal  cost  to  households  without  connections  -- and  thus  have  a  strong  incentive
to work out arrangements  to do so.  For example,  a single  household  with an
unmetered  connection  in  some  parts  of Enugu,  the  capital  of  Anambra  State,  may
supply  water  to  as  many  as  20  or 30  other  families,  charging  each  a  flat  monthly
fee.  The higher  the fl-t  monthly  fee charged  by the  water authority  for an
unmetered  private  connection,  the  greater  the  incentive  for  other  households  to
purchase  water  from  a household  that  has an unmetered  connection,  rather  than
connecting to the system themselves.  The unmetered private connections
essentially  serve  as  free-enterprise  public  taps  for  the  unconnected  households,
a scheme  that  typically  entails  major  revenue  losses  for  the  water  authority.
5.06  Unrmetered  private connections  have another major disadvantage.
Because such systems run large deficits,  they must be subsidized.  These
subsidies  almost  always  benefit  the  upper-  and  middle-income  households  that  can
afford  the  initial  costs  of  a  private  connection.  In  many  cases,  once  installed,
an unmetered  private  connection  will  not  cost  its  owner  anything  further;  it  is
not  unusual  for  the  owner  to  collect  much  more in  revenues  from  neighbors  than
the  flat  monthly  rate  he pays  to the  water  authority.
5.07  For  a cost  recovery  scheme  to  be successful,  it  must adapt  to the
existing  economic  and political  realities. The present  water  vending  system
through  tanker  trucks  and  neighbors  illustrates  one  way this  can  be done.  The
key  feature  of the  vending  system  is  that  households  are  not  obliged  to  buy  from
vendors;  they are free to purchase  water  when they  wish.  The water  vending
system  thus  provides  households  with the  flexibility  over  their  cash  flow  that
they  demand. Also,  tanker  trucks  do  not  face  the  political  problems  -over  water
service  that  confront  the  government,  because  households  do not feel  that the
owners  of tanker  trucks  should  provide  them  with  free  or subsidized  water. It
is  generally  accepted  that  vendors  are  in business  to  make a profit. Despite
the fact that  some  households  do feel  exploited  by tanker  trucks,  they still
believe  that  vendors  provide  a  valuable  service  and  are  willing  to  pay  for  it.
Improved  Water  Vending
5.08  There  are essentially  four  ways in which improved  water services
could be organized  in the rural areas of Anambra State that would permit
households  to pay  only for  the  water  they  use.  The first  would  be to improve
the  tanker  truck  vending  system  itself.  The  present  vending  system  has  two  main
problems:  the  price  of  water  is  high  and  the  service  is  often  unreliable.  Based
on previous  analysis  of the  cost  structure  of tanker  truck  vending  in  Anambra
State,& the high cost of water from tanker  trucks  in urban areas probably
reflects  both the  high  real  cost  of delivery  and  the  monopolistic  structure  of
the  tanker  truck  industry.
3/  See  Whittington,  Lauria,  and  Mu, 1989.- 25 -
5.09  If  the  main  reason  for  the  high  prices  of  vended  water  in  the  rural
areas  were  monopolistic  pricing,  then  one  way  of improving  the  existing  vending
system  would  be to lower  the price through  price regulation  or by removing
barriers  to  entry  to  the  business.  However,  this  would  probably  only  exacerbate
the present  reliability  problems,  and does not appear  to be a promising  or
practical  solution. 34 In  our opinion  the  principal  reason  for  the  high prices
in  the  rural  areas  is  probably  the  high  costs  of delivery  and  not  monopolistic
pricing. For  example  households  in remote  villages  often  go to urban  areas  to
try  to  persuade  the  tanker  trucks  to come  to their  village  to sell  water,  hut
many  times  are  unsuccessful.  This  suggests  that  it  is  more  profitable  for  tanker
trucks  to sell  water in urban  areas  and easily  accessible  rural  communities.
If this  is true,  then  the  way to lower  the  price  of water  is to find  a way to
deliver  it  more  efficiently.
5.10  In  our  view lowering  the  cost  of delivery  by tanker  trucks  will  be
increasingly  difficult  because  of the  deterioration  of the  tanker  truck  fleet.
The tanker  trucks  are  currently  in  very  poor  condition,  and  most will  only  be
in  service  for  at most  a few  more  years. This  aging  of the  tanker  truck  fleet
is  a  major problem looming  on  the  horizon  for  rural  communities  in  Anambra State.
Most  of these  tanker  trucks  were  purchased  when the  Naira  was  much  more  highly
valued, 11' and it is extremely  unlikely  that  it will  be profitable  to purchase
new trucks  at current  exchange  rates.  Therefore,  tanker  trucks  will likely
provide  less  and less  service  to rural  areas. Unless  another  means  of water
provision  is found,  households  in rural  areas  will increasingly  be forced  to
return  to traditional  water  sources,  with  adverse  economic  and  health  effects.
Metered  Private  Connections
5.11  The second  alternative  is  metered  private  connections,  where  each
household  pays  a monthly  bill  based  on actual  consumption  (with  the  costs  of
connection  financed  either by ASWC or the household).  Our respondents'
willingness-to-pay  bids  were for  a  flat  rate,  unmetered  private  connection,  not
for  a  metered  connection.)-  The  full  costs  of  a  metered  private  connection  would
be on the order of N30-40 per month for a household  with a typical  water
consumption  level.  From our analysis  of these  willingness-to-pay  bids for
unmetered  connections,  it appears  likely  that  private  metered  connections  are
1i/  See  Lee  and  Anas,  1989,  for  a  discussion  of the  importance  of  reliability
in the  provision  of infrastructure  services.
j5/  Since  1984  th^  value  of the  Naira  has  fallen  to  one.tenth  of its  previous
value  relative  to  major  foreign  currencies.
1&/  In fact,  respondents  could  have  been asked  whether  they  would  choose  to
have  a  metered  connection  if  the  price  of  water  were  some  specified  emount. This
is only feasible  where people are already  purchasing  water regularly  on a
volumetric  basis.  In  most situations  it is  very difficult  for  a respondent  to
give  meaningful  answers  when the  WTP questions  are  structured  this  way  because
he cannot  calculate  how  much  water  he would  purchase  at different  prices,  and
thus  does  not  know  the  implications  of  his  answer  in  terms  of  his  total  monthly
expenditure.  See Whittington,  1988, for a discussion  of some of the issues
involved.- 26 -
too  expensive  for  the  majority  of  households  in  rural  areas  of  northern  Anambra
State  unless  substantial  subsidies  can  be  provided.  However,  a  sizable  minority
of households  would  probably  be willing  to pay the full costs of a private
connection.
Kiosk  Systems
5.12  The third  alternative  is a kiosk  system,  which  would  also permit
households  to  pay  for  water  only  when  they  use  it (see  Box  1). Water  kiosks  have
generally  been  considered  an  unattractive  cost  recovery  mechanism  in  developing
countries'  in large  part because  of the higher  labor costs  necessitated  by
keeping  attendants  at the  kiosks  (van  Wijk-Sijbesma  1987).  Because  the  labor  of
kiosk  attendants  constitutes  a large  portion  of the  operating  costs  of a kiosk
system,  the  number  of taps  in the  community  might  have to  be limited  in  order
to  lower  these  labor  costs  and  ensure  sufficient  sales  from  each  kiosk. A  kiosk
system  may  thus  increase  travel  time  for  some  households  and  possibly  reduce  the
amount  of  water  households  consume  from  the  new  system  compared  to  a  water  system
with free  public  taps.
5.13  However,  there  are  three  main  advantages  of  a  kiosk  system  and  their
importance  has generally  been  underestimated.  First,  a reliable  kiosk  system
would  provide  households  witli  even  more control  over their  cash flow than a
reliable  tanker  truck  vending  system. A kiosk  syster  should  run  every  day  for
many  hours,  and  household  members  could  purchase  whatever  quantity  they  wish  at
any  time.
5.14  Second,  kiosk  systems  offer  a means  of overcoming  people's  lack  of
confidence  in  the  ability  of the  government  to  provide  improved  water  supplies.
A kiosk  system  does  not require  an advance  payment  by the  household.  nor does
it depend  on the  household's  trust  in the  government:  households  do not  have
to  make  any  payment  for  water  until  they  receive  it.
5.15  Third,  evidence  from  a  recent  study  in  Tanzania  suggests  that  kiosk
systems  should  be able to generate  substantially  higher  revenues  than a flat
monthly  fee (see  Box  2).  Households  will  pay  substantially  more for  water  on
a  monthly  basis  if they  can  purchase  it  by the  bucket  than  if  they  are  required
to pay  a fixed  monthly  fee  once  a month  for  access  to a public  tap  where  they
can collect  as much water as they want.  If this were true just because
households  are  ignorant  of the  total  amount  they  spend  when  they  purchase  water
on  a  daily  basis,  then  the  increased  revenue  available  from  a  kiosk  system  would
simply  be a transfer  payment from  households  to the  water utility  or kiosk
licensee.  However,  in our opinion  a substantial  portion  of this increased
revenue  is  probably  payment  for  a  welfare  gain--not  a  transfer  payment--because
of the  greater  control  the  kiosk  system  offers  households  over their  variable
and  limited  cash  flow.
5.16  The  increase  in  gross  revenues  from  a  kiosk  system  is  not,  of  course,
the  appropriate  comparison,  because  kiosk  systems  cost  more  to  operate  and  manage
than  a  cost  recovery  system  with  a  fixed  monthly  fee  for  public  taps. However,
even taking  account  of the  added  costs  of running  the  kiosks,  it seems  to  be
feasible  in  these  areas  of  Anambra  State  to  recover  a  substantial  portion  of  the
total  costs  of the  water  project  with a kiosk  system--much  more than can  be
recovered  with the  existing  cost  recovery  system.- 27
BOX:1: CHARACTERISTICS  OF A  WATER  KIOSK  SYSTEM
A  kiosk  system  is  essentially  an  alternative  type  of  water  vending
system  where  water  is  sold  by the  gallon  or  by a  standard  size  container  at
one or more  points  in the  community. A kiosk  system  can  be organized  in
various  ways..  In its  simplest  form,  a kiosk  system  does  not  even require
a pipeline  distribution  system;  water  is  simply.  sold  from  one  or  more  taps
at the borehole.  If a single  distribution  line is constructed,  kiosks
(i.e.  ,  points  where  the  water  is  sold).  can  be located  along  the  pipeline  at
a few  contveinient  locations.  Each  kiosk.must  have  an attendant  who  collects
the  money,  and  there  must  be a  means.  of  locking  the  tap  when  the  attendant
is gone  or  -the  tap-  is  closed.
In.addition  to  determining  the  rnumber  of  kiosks  to  be  operated  in
a community,-  the  water  authority  or community  leadership  must decide  who
will  operate-the.kiosks.  There  are  three  main  options. The  kiosks  can  be
operated  by (1)  the  community  government  or  water  committee,  (2)  the  water
authority  itself,  or (3)  a  private  individual  or  group  which  is  licensed  by
the  water  authority  or  community.  All  of  these  organizational  alternatives
maintain  the'  principal  advantage  of the  kiosk  system  that  households  do  not
have:.  to-pay.  :for water  untll  they  re-ceive  It.
If the-operation  of the  kiosk  system  is consigned  to  a licensee,
the:water  authority  or  community  can  either  (1)  meter  the  water  sold  by  each
-kiosk  an-d  charge the licensee  for the volume sold, or (2) charge  the
licensee  a.flat  rate  for  the  right  to sell  an unspecified  amount  of water
or let the  l'icensee  set the  price.  Of course,  if the  price  is fixed  too
low,  it is  possible  that  no one  will  want to  run  the  kiosk  system. If the
price  is  set  too  high  or left  to  the  discretion  of the  licensee,  then  there
is  the  possibility  that  the  licensee  may  cap-ture  substantial  economic  rents.28 -
BOX 2:  HOU$EHOLDS  IN  NEWALA  DISTRICT,  TANZANIA  MAY PREFER,A  KIOSK
SYSTEM-TO  FIXED  MONTHLY7FEES  PORMUNLIHITED  ACCESS  TO PUBLIC'TAPS.
Newala  Districtt  is located  in  southern:  Tanzrania  along--the  border
with  Mozambique,  and  is  one.of.the  poorest'regions  of  Tanzania. Per  capita
cash  'ineomeis  on the  order  of  US$20  per;'year-.  Most  of Newala  District  is
on  tle  Makonde  Plateau,  which  is  300-800  meters  above  sea  level  and  has  no
perennial  s'urface  water  sources. Piped  water-systems  with deep  boreholes
are  the  only  long-term solution for :pkroviding  water  for  domestic
consumption.
In  1957  the  British  administration  commissioned  the  Makonde  Water
Supply  System, the first large-scale  piped distribution  system  in the
district. The  operation  and  maintenance  costs  of the  Makonde  scheme  were
financed  by a system  of kiosks  which sold water to individuals  by the
bucket.  The  Government  of Tanzania  abolished  this  kiosk  system  in 19-69,
and  since  then  water  has  been  .provided  topeople from-the  publi  taps.free
of charge..  Although  water  from  the  public  taps,  is freej.  it is of  ten  not
available  because  the  Minfstry'of  Water  does.  not'have  sufficient  funds  to
operate the,  system on a  full-time  basis.  When  the system is not
function,ing,-  villages  are.without  water,  and.their  residen.ts.search*  for
water from either  traditional  sources  or villages  which at the time  are
receiving  water. The  traditional  sources  are  typically  5-10  miles  away  from
a  village,  and  women  spend  much  of  the  day  collecting  one  bucket  of  water
for  their  family. Public  taps  with  more  reliable  service  often  have  queues
of  a.few  hundred  people  who  have  walked  from  as  many  as ten  other  villages.
Queues  sometimes  take  more  than  24  hours.
-study  was  recently  undertaken  to.  determine  whether  households
served  by the  Makonde  seheme  were  willing  to  ontribute to'  the-operatpiont  and
maintenance  costs  of their  water  system  so.  that  it  could'bekept xrunning,
and  if  so,  what  type  of  cost  recovery  system  they  would prefer.  Wh.en.  a-sked
directly  whether  they  would  prefer  to  have a system  of kiosks  similar  to
the old British system introduced  in 1957 or to pay a  fixed fee for
unlimited  access  to a public  fountain,  the  majority  of respondents  said
that  they  would  prefer  a  kiosk  system.
If a  new system  of  kiosks  was  established  and the  price  of  water
was set at Tsh 0.50 per bucket (about  Us$o  oo5),  90 percent of  the
households  indicated  that  they  would  purchase  'water  from  the  kiosk  s-ystem.
The total  net revenues  :from  such  a  -system  of  kiosks  were  estimat.edto-be
about  twice  as  high  as that  which  could  be,--:ollected  with  a  system  of fixed
monthly fees  for unlimited'  access to  public  fountains,  (Pot more
information  see  Whittington,  Mufwahuzi,  McMahon,  and  Choe,  1989.).- 29 -
5.17  For  example,  for  a  village with  a  population  of  10,000  inhabitants,
the  total  monthly  capital  and  operating  costs  of  a  rural  water  systems  are  about
Nl19,000.0 To these  costs  must be added  the expenses  of running  the  kiosks
themselves.  Assume  that  one  tap  would  be  required  per  500  people,  and  that  each
kiosk  would  have 2 taps  from  which  people  could  collect  water.  The  community
would  thus  require  10  kiosks. Assuming  each  kiosk  attendant  is  paid  N25  per  day,
the  monthly  labor  costs  of the  10  kiosk  attendants  would  be about  N8,000. Total
monthly  costs  of the  water  system  would  thus  be about  N27,000.
5.18  The  total  revenues  from  such  a system  can  also  be  approximated  (see
Figures  12  and 13). Assume  that  per  capita  water  consumption  is  4 gallons  per
day  and  that  50  percent  of the  water  consumed  in  the  village  would  be purchased
from  kiosks.  In this  case each tap  would  only  have to serve  on average  250
people and queue times  would not be excessive  if sufficient  pressure  were
maintained.  Households  currently  sell  water  to  neighbors  for  NO.70  to  N1.00  per
4-gallon  bucket (NO.18-0.25  per gallon);  suppose  that the kiosk system  only
charged  NO.20  per  4-gallon  bucket  (NO.05  per  gallon)  in  the  dry  season  and  NO.10
per  hucket (NO.025  per gallon)  in the rainy  season. Given  these  assumptions
monthly  gross  revenues  in  the  dry  season  would  be N30,000;  in  the  rainy  season
they  would  be N15,000.  Such  revenues  should  be sufficient  to  pay  over  80  percent
of the  total  annual  costs--both  the  capital  and the  operating  and  maintenance
costs--of  the  improved  water  system.
5.19  In several  respects  these  assumptions  are  quite  conservative.  Per
capita  consumption  could  easily  reach  5 or 6 gallons  per day when water is
readily  available  from  a  kiosk,  and  it is likely  that  more  than  50 percent  of
the  water  consumed  in the  village  would  be obtained  from  the  kiosk  system  (see
Box  3).  It is  thus  entirely  possible  that  full  cost  recovery  could  be achieved
in  many  places. However,  given  the  volatility  of the  cost  estimates,  the  extent
to  which  kiosk  systems  can  achieve  full  cost  recovery  in  different  locations  must
still  be considered  uncertain.  It  does  appear  though  that  the  revenue  potential
from  kiosks  is significantly  higher  than  for other  cost recovery  mechanisms.
Thus,  whatever  the  final  capital  and  operations  costs  of  the  water  system,  kiosks
are likely  to recover  a  much  higher  proportion  of these  costs  than  alternative
approaches.
5.20  There  are  two  main  reasons  why  we  believe  that  most  households  would
prefer  to  obtain  water  from  a  well-run,  reliable  kiosk  system  than  from  tanker
trucks. First,  in the long  run  the  price  of water  from the  kiosks  should  be
substantially  cheaper  than  water  from  neighbors  supplied  by  tanker  trucks  or  from
tanker  trucks  directly.  Second,  since  the  service  provided  by tanker  trucks  is
often  unreliable,  people  would  be more likely  to go to a kiosk  for  water  than
to  wait  for  a  tanker  to  come. As  communities  become  more  affluent  and  the  value
of some  households'  time increases,  vendors  using carts,  bicycles,  or simply
poles  or yokes  may  carry  water  from  the  kiosks  direct:.y  to  households. Such  a
development  should  cause  no financial  problems  for  the  kiosk  system  as long  as
such  vendors  are  charged  the  same  price  for  water  as individuals  who  walk  to  the
kiosk  and  purchase  water  directly.
1I/  This  figure  is  based  on  the  cost  estimates  presented  in  Table  3. Capital
costs  assume  a capital  recovery  factor  of 0.16;  operating  costs  include  labor,
fuel  and  lubricants,  and  minor  maintenance.- 30  -
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BOX  3:  A DESCRIPTION  OF  AN OPERATING  KIOSK  SYSTEM  IN  UKUNDA,  KENYA
Ukunda  is  a  village  of about  5,000  people  located  40 km south  of
Mombasa  in  the  Kwale  District  of  Kenya. The  residents-of  Ukunda  have  access
:..:to  several  water  sources,  including  6 opelnwells,  5 haudpumps,  about  90
---  w-ater.  vendorS,  and  13  water:ki-osks.  ->£Thekosks-  re-supplied  with  vater  b
a  pipeline  which  the  Ministry  of  Water:  Development  (MWD)  designed  --to  serve
the  resortthotels  on Dani  iBeach  just  a f.w  kilomters.  a.  ;
The  kiosks  -sell  water  to individuals  and  to water  vendors,  both
:of  whom pay  for  -water  by the bucket  or jerrycan.  The kiosk  oWners  are
licensed  by the  MWD and  have metered  connections;  they  pay the  -MWD  0.05
Kenyan  shillings  (in  1986  US$1.00  - 16  ks)  per  20  liters  (US$0.16  per  cubic
meter). The kiosks  charge  0.15  ks (US$0.01)  per.  20-liter  jerrycan  -The
vendors  carry  water in 20-liter  plastic  jerrycans,  transported  either  by
--  carts  or  bicycles  and  deliver  water  directly  to the  household. The carts
have  a  single  axle  with  two  automobile  tires  and  are  pushed  by  hand  similar
to:a  wheelbarrow.
Individuals  -have  a  choice  between  purchasing  water  from  vendors
:ata price of 1.5 ks per 20-liter  jerrye,"  (US$4.70  per cubic meter),
purchasing  water  from  a kiosk,  or collecti:ng  water  free  from  an  open  well
or.  handpmp.  , The  majority  of the  population  of  Ukunda  chooses  to  pay for
their water  and  obtain  it  from  the  kiosk  system:,.  either  directly  by  walking
to a kiosk  -or  indirectly  by purchasirng  from  a vendor. During.  t:he  rainy
season  water  vendors  supplied  about  45 percent.of  the  total  water  consumed
i'in  the:  vill-age.  Of:the'water  collected  directly  by indivi'duals,-64percent
"was.  obtai,ned:.from  kiosks':  18'percent  fro,mhand  pu  ps,  -and;  I8  -ere.nt  rom
::open.'.wells:.  The-k:-Th  iosk  system  thus,.p-rovided-  e'ithor,  drect  drectl1
abou 80  pecn  fte  ae  osmd  inUnd  (45-  pe~Orcent  `6f  thttal
apopulatio  wa6  sup'pliedy:*  ksk''nd**
-. f35  percent  of the  population  collected  the:ir  water  from:  iosks  dir ctly.)
35-  pe  c  n  :  -ro-:-  - -k  -i-r  .-.-.. 
The  costs  of the.kiosk  system  to the  MWD are  very  low  because  it
.:-.-does  not  incur  the  expense  of an exte,nsive  distribution  network,-  nr.  -... does
it.have  to  render  and  collect  bills  from  a large  rnum,ber  of customers.,  MWD...
should  be able  to recover  its  full  production  coSt  by  selling  water  to  .:the
kiosk  owners  for-US$0.16  per  cubic  meter. The  r'residents  themselves  must  be
better  off  than  they  would  be  without,the  kiosk.system  becausethey s-till
have the choice  to collect.  water free.  from  open wells  and  hatndpumps.  nd
choose.  not  to.  do so.  (For  more  :information  s-ee:  Whittington,  TAuria, Okun
and  Mu,.  1989.)
----  - :  --  :.:-.:-.---.-----..-.......- 32 -
5.21  The principal  disadvantage  of a kiosk  system  is the  necessity  of
developing  an improved  system of financial  management  to handle the cash
collected  by the  kiosk  attendants.  A kiosk  system  may  perhaps  be more  complex
from a cash management  point of view than a system  of flat monthly fees.
However,  a system  based on flat monthly  fees is not likely  to collect  any
significant  amount of revenue.  Any  system that is likely to recover a
substantial  amount  of the  costs  of  a  water  system  will  entail  the  establishment
of some  metering  and  rendering  of  bills  based  on  the  volume  used. Hence  in  the
study  area  cost  recovery  is  not  possible  in  any  case  without  improved  financial
management,  and  a kiosk  system  does  not  present  especially  difficult  or unique
financial  management  problems.  However,  the significance  of the financial
management  problems  associated  with any cost recovery  scheme  should  not be
underestimated  for  rural  water  supply  projects.  Unless  the  funds  generated  are
properly  managed  and accounted  for, the resources  will not be available  to
provide  and  maintain  reliable,  high  quality  service,  and  the  water  system  will
fall  into  disrepair.
5.22  To  reduce  the  danger  of  further  revenue  losses  and  public  complaints
of mismanagement,  the  prudent  course  would  be to  meter  the  water  sold  by each
kiosk  and  charge  by  volume  dispensed,  either  direct  to  the  buyer  or  to  a  licensed
distributor  who  manages  the  kiosk.  If services  are  licensed--whether  metered
or  unmetered--it  is  essential  to  the  success  of the  system  that  household  users
be assured  that  the  retail  prices  set  by the  licensee  are  fair  and  reasonable.
People  clearly  already  recognize  that  private  purveyors  of  a  commodity  or  service
are  entitled  to a  profit,  but they  also  have learned  to  beware  of  exploitative
pricing. If  the  majority  of  villages  in  a region  installed  and  operated  kiosk
systems, the availability  of information  on  the price of water sold in
neighboring  villages  should  serve to regulate  exploitative  pricing  by kiosk
operators  in  a specific  village.
5.23  To  help  meet  the  year-round  cash  needs  of  both  the  water  system  and
household  users,  a seasonally-adjusted  pricing  scheme  could  be implemented  to
reflect  the reduced  demand  for  water  by households  in the rainy  season.  It
should  be  designed  to  cover  all  capital  and  operating  costs  of the  kiosk  system
(and any private  metered lines)  on an annual  basis--i.e.  to operate at a
substantial  profit  during  the  dry  season  and  incur  equivalent  losses  during  the
rainy  season.2
5.24  A  seasonal  pricing  strategy  would  try  to  wean  the  customers  away  from
traditional  sources  by charging  a  very  modest  rate  during  the  rainy  season  for
an initial  period  of, say, two years.  When people  become  convinced  of the
benefits  of an improved  water  system  even  in  the  rainy  season,  they  may  become
willing  to  abandon  traditional  water  sources  almost  altogether.  If  the  revenues
collected  can be used to ensure  the reliability  of the piped system,  this
strategy  would  overcome  their  distrust  in government's  ability  to deliver  and
operate  an improved  water  system  and  gradually  increase  their  confidence  in the
system  and  their  willingness  to  pay  for  the  improved  and  reliable  service.
1f/  As  a  practical  matter,  it  may  be  preferable  to  initiate  service  from  kiosks
during  the  dry  season  because  then  the  price  differential  between
the  dry  and  rainy  season  can  be  presented  to  customers  as  a  rainy  season  discount
rather  than  a dry  season  surcharge.33 -
A Kiosk  System  and  Metered  Private  Connections
5.25  A fourth  alternative  would  be a combination  of kiosks  and  metered
private  connections,  in  which  households  with  connections  were illowed  to sell
water  to  neighbors.  The  data  from  this  study  suggest  that  a  substantial  minority
of  households  in  rural  communities  in  Nsukka  district  can  afford  the  full  costs
of a  private  connection.  Households  with  private  connections  often  sell  water
to neighbors,  in which  case household  connections  effectively  become  private
kiosks. If  the  water  utility  charges  households  with  metered  private  connections
at  the  least  the  average  costs  of  supplying  water,  the  sale  of  water  to  neighbors
does  not  result  in financial  losses  to  the  water  utility  and  should  in fact  be
encouraged.  If  a significant  number  of  households  in  a  community  sell  water  to
neighbors,  competitive  conditions  should  ensure  that  the  price  of  water  sold  to
the  households  without  connections  is  not  set  much  above  the  price  of  water  which
households  with  connections  pay  the  water  utility.
5.27  If households sell water  to neighbors, the number of water
distribution  points  in the community  increases,  and as a result  the average
distance  households  without  connections  must  walk to  collect  water  is  reduced.
Also,  queue  times  would  be reduced. This  reduction  in travel  and queue  times
is likely  to result  in a very high percentage  of the  population  electing  to
obtain  their  water from the piped distribution  system--either  directly  from
kiosks  or their  own  private  connections,  or indirectly  from  neighbors  who  have
a connection.  In  the  extreme  case  there  may  be so  many  households  with  private
connections  supplying  neighbors  that  public  kiosks  become  redundant.- 34  -
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
6.01  At the  end  of  one  of the  household  interviews  a  respondent  told  one
of our  enumerators,  "Don't  forget  us;  we are  waiting  for  water." This  parting
remark  perhaps  best summarizes  the  current  situation  in the  rural  water  sector
in  Anambra  State. ASWC  does  not  have  the  financial  resources  to construct  and
run  a sufficient  number  of  water  systems  to serve  the  rural  population,  and  it
is  waiting  for  the  villages  to  mobilize  financial  resources  to  pay  the  costs  of
improved  water  systems.  On the  other  hand,  many  people  in  the  villages  continue
to wait for subsidized services  rather than initiating  efforts to help
themselves.
6.02  This impasse  between  the  people  and the  state  is typical  of many
rural  water supply  programs  in Africa.  Until the underlying  political  and
economic  reasons  for  this  situation  are  simultaneously  addressed,  cost  recovery
will  remain  an elusive  goal  in  the  rural  water  sector. Efforts  to  achieve  cost
recovery  have often  been.  halfhearted,  in  part because  they  have usually  been
predicated  on the  false  assumption  that  people  cannot  afford  to  pay  very  much
for  water,  when in fact  they  often  pay  exorbitant  amounts.
6.03  Attempts  at  cost  recovery  have  also  floundered  because  public  water
authorities  are  often  out  of  touch  with  people's  preferences  about  when  they  want
to  buy  water  and  how they  want to  pay for  it.  The results  of this  study  show
that  households  want more flexibility  and  control  over their  expenditures  on
water  than  is  available  from  a  cost  recovery  system  based  on fixed  monthly  fees
that  must be paid throughout  the year.  One of the reasons  households  are
reluctant  to  commit  themselves  to  a  year-round  fixed  monthly  payment  is  that  they
sometimes  have other,  higher-priority  uses for their  limited  cash resources
(e.g.,  medical  emergencies,  seasonal  agricultural  expenses).
6.04  One  of  the  lessons  from  this  study  is  that  the  design  of  appropriate
cost recovery  systems  must take  account  of the  political  consequences  of past
failures  to provide  water to communities. In Anambra  State the extent  of
mistrust  and  lack  of confidence  in  the  rural  water  schemes  is  such  that  people
are simply  not  willing  to  pay  very  much for  water  until  they  actually  receive
it.  Any cost recovery  system  which  fails  to recognize  this  is not likely  to
succeed.  Although  people  are  very  reluctant  to  pay  government  based  on  promises
of improved  water services  in the future,  current  private  markets  for  water
demonstrate  that  people  are  quite  willing  to  pay  for  specific  volumes  at  point
of purchase.
6.05  In our opinion,  kiosk systems--or  kiosks  in tandem  with metered
private  connections-  -offer  the  most  promising  approach  for  breaking  this  impasse
in  the  provision  of  rural  water  systems  in  Anambra  State. Such  systems  can  both
achieve  greater  cost  recovery  and  meet  the  cash  flow  preferences  of consumers.
Seasonal  pricing  may  be necessary  to  compete  with  traditional  water  sources  in
the  rainy  season,  but this  is  a  primarily  a problem  of rate  design.- 35
6.06  Adequate  financial  collection  and  control  measures  must  be part  of
any  kiosk  system. The  cash  management  requirements  of  a  kiosk  system  may  be  more
complex  than  those  for  a system  based  on flat  monthly  charges.  But  at least  in
the  rural  areas  of  Anambra  State,  any  system  designed  to  recover  a substantial
portion  of the costs  of an improved  water  system  will mean metering  and the
calculation  of  bills  based  on the  volume  consumed  by users.  In this  regard  a
kiosk  system  or  a  kiosk  system  with  metered  private  connections  does  not  present
especially  difficult  or unique  financial  management  problems.
6.07  Rural  water  supply  programs  must  be  adequately  funded  if  systems  are
to  be reliable  and  replicable.  In  most  cases  such  funds  can  only  come  from  the
beneficiaries  themselves,  which  means  that  Bank  operations  in the  sector  must
carefully  consider  what type of cost recovery  system is appropriate  in a
particular  context.  This  study  suggests  that  the  standard  arrangements  for  cost
recovery  in  the  rural  water  sector--fixed  monthly  fees  for  both  public  taps  and
unmetered  private connections--are  inappropriate  in the Nsukka district  of
Anambra  State,  Nigeria. Although  it is not  yet possible  to generalize  these
results  to other  parts  of Nigeria  or to other  developing  countries,  it seems
likely  that the advantages  of kiosks  systems  and  metered  private  connections
discussed  here  will  be  equally  valid  in  many  other  places.  Certainly  households'
desire  for  greater  control  over  their  limited  cash  resources  and  their  reluctance
to  make  advance  payments  for  improved  water  supplies  based  on  government  promises
are  not  unique  to  Nsukka  district  or to  Nigeria.
6.08  Since  kiosk  systems  and  systems  with  both  kiosks  and  metered  private
connections  appear  to  be promising  cost  recovery  mechanisms,  there  is a great
need for more experience  with their  operational  and managerial  aspects in
different  field  conditions. Managers  of rural  water  programs  thus  need to  be
convinced that kiosks systems and metered private connections  have many
attractive  features and are  a  legitimate  organizational  arrangement  for
recovering  the costs of water service.  They should  also be encouraged  to
experiment  with different  types  of  kiosk  systems  in order  to determine  how to
design  and  organize  systems  which  are  appropriate  for  the  communities  for  which
they  are  responsible.
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